Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 59c45270d6700f71…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

236.5 KB Created: 2020-10-24 17:18:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: b0bb2f4457bdd5c040b2896dc6f44387 SHA-1: 295c69b9b032e93e891cc9b643c79532c0efb06c SHA-256: 59c45270d6700f712d625357442e40203dad60a01da25f3bb1d80f5de66963e5
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a potentially risky file type (JAR extension). Static triage also flagged this as a suspicious extracted artifact. The presence of these embedded objects strongly suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary payload, likely an executable or script, when the document is opened.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
852efeac79800dbb00896def3b39d0c15673dd627ca345d486a2c1c04c9853d5		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 226816 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
7556ad8090d98c9f60d83179fe73baf835c71950e1b88c896eca0c0263f01072		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 222719 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
c24d5f857c8c4de1ce6dae87b32b4628ae8799656159aa74e1366ca2bbf47ea7		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5132 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.