Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 59b4702cd0c51c54…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.28 MB Created: 2020-05-07 First seen: 2020-05-14
MD5: 8702385f0a64bf1aa8e202430692a9e6 SHA-1: 758541f9d90a87b9f97bbc6c2c7d65e9d4ebf1cf SHA-256: 59b4702cd0c51c54e7872bd2d0db8015102f555d8a55779e6a9a08f42ae38c08
162 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1508KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002904.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2904 748091 bytes
SHA-256: d38b43a66acc1d4059183ebd9f620edb6f9d0bdb465899f2a31d09f00351e8c4