Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 59a0532f23d4a3ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF

71.0 KB First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: db42352fbbee4e066a6d33782c2ec1aa SHA-1: 4d217537354306a0d109e330934f6f6e0626e363 SHA-256: 59a0532f23d4a3ef3c40849bd8ff97fa6b25a190c61f3f2c5b347da9db9c3ed1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability and OLE object activation. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. The embedded OLE object, 'objdata_00_off000017ad.bin', is likely the payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000017ad.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x17AD 1817 bytes
SHA-256: d998823f4ecf366912a4ed1a2c046cfca5504eee4c596c0d8e5ed4e7d47b2568