Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 59930d80f7534d0f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.2 KB Created: 2021-06-02 10:34:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: be198d89d5b7e0f4e540aa8445196a9c SHA-1: 92e15385bd3324ff4c9454ddda648ccdc11d1c06 SHA-256: 59930d80f7534d0f54a869519d84950311af9d7f336105ccd5bbf9d6facee57a
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO spam operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nomylo.ru/pbw?utm_term=legend+of+zelda+ocarina+of+time+n64+walkthrough+pdf
    • https://fabidarupevonu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134620419/7156700.pdf
    • https://xinorexuvon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134608307/5398079.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4477629/normal_604b3dd8eaccd.pdf
    • https://ximapufem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437784/4831239.pdf
    • https://sunapasodaveka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135330332/xolatigujis_buvodide.pdf
    • https://gatiwisukebemo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438587/bee1ac2.pdf
    • https://kulegireketo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135325025/d5f09d69.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4485718/normal_6033cc63708cf.pdf
    • https://nekemefewebewon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/7/5/137504470/ad0b4557727.pdf
    • https://bewebisiseten.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874130/3824540.pdf
    • https://kipunelikerave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969086/segokonalom.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://kunixove.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144485682/jofumuzoxejavo.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/001b184a-13fc-4734-bd09-d23c64b08dd9/38940534669.pdf
    • http://vifogajo.pbworks.com/f/how_to_play_chrome_dino.pdf
    • http://mogulazedub.pbworks.com/f/exercices_coder_et_dcoder_un_dplacement_sur_quadrillage_ce2.pdf
    • http://vawijoj.pbworks.com/f/13896490371.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f59ed0e3-d689-419e-9194-0b744af86678/different_types_of_family_therapy_approaches.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/63f7bb18-7780-493e-a63e-b6d2fac87e26/gifofavazobak.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e7a1.bin
e8ede18660ea44b445db5b706686a6bfa6ccf4e39f7b6bac969bcaa24042a6bf		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7A1 5780 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb57.bin
064b0c8c6c73f4e7ce99c1c0e58c9e31fc5b565fa62293ca8e0fb28cff545110		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB57 11984 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.