Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5986fda10c3ab71a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.24 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-18
MD5: ffb83ba7b0f6045a7bdb490dfa006fd6 SHA-1: a1bd01d04dd999a983be9d9cf59c815086f4fd1f SHA-256: 5986fda10c3ab71a4a519682da34fa5b29df54da0620f30d77d24fd36a72cf12
332 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable or archive. The ClamAV signature indicates this is a known downloader family. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the exploit chain is clear.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
1a7dfd767f129b6649c8178bd92961a9d41759882617ae2697644021c8142796		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00059A86/Ole10natIVE 1499 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005f200.pdf
369fd42a77cdaaa1b11c0a27583e65b78eab745bdcaa37cd0f6fb588ee15b335		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5F200 907776 bytes
stream_004_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0002b37d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B37D 12100 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0002d195.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2D195 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
c7cc51bbe04121f19739e2f2774e081293e495ace679bac3ac384c4a3b07df9d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1293312 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
c4966e9e254fc9b183dcf42f0b8b0d749f1ad07ece5bbd1f88abcfc598108495		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1271296 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029400.pdf
4aa98d98fdee1c2c6b7ffb7213e29b286695e48a70ea99b313df45c069a1da91		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29400 1128448 bytes

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