RTF malware analysis — malicious · 594a87c29c9cc15c

MALICIOUS

RTF

21.0 KB

MD5: 55ba2200f4ed8fe9df83fdf4e6357ade SHA-1: fc11cb1ba56832ac539fa11c4c96be4783c600f2 SHA-256: 594a87c29c9cc15c887c546f398007e4c3f3d04f94ddfcb5ad971d41d69ecedc

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple high-severity heuristics indicating the presence and automatic activation of OLE objects. Specifically, RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE suggest that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically launched upon opening the document. The RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM heuristic further confirms the presence of a decoded OLE object. While no scripts were extracted, the structure strongly implies a malicious OLE object designed to execute an arbitrary payload.

Heuristics 4

Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001849.bin` `2fa539ad8e4c6513bc224772d5c8a4d9bd585e7d40792543db8567f6a50a461e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1849	3680 bytes

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