Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 593a88f403876ce7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.5 KB Created: 2020-12-14 18:15:01 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 70dc65362f69d59f26877d390015e7c5 SHA-1: 9d5b885913890b288fd6e4eec5076b7d8057598b SHA-256: 593a88f403876ce75c0deb64128c26e1e4cffdefe2a25e10933eda3642c0109e
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing indicating it links to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The embedded URL points to a suspicious domain, likely serving as a lure for phishing or malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and the malicious link strongly suggest an attempt to redirect the user to a harmful site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?utm_term=vampyre+magick%253A+the+grimoire+of+the+living+vampire+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://bugitepekasi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134669175/vujiwupa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wadonado.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134677460/7111.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373987/normal_5f933f8591d9f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://biparobotimipus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134498468/fc3d63189683.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4455374/normal_5fa9b02b9b73b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dowazulipogopu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322731/6a9ad9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365552/normal_5f8700fa7871a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xixemoxutosiseg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134473276/vofobegejubisu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vovikadu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134587732/1362580.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://roxoxurapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134307884/3747830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc13274cd1e280355d63052/t/5fc57e8b7acac6192a7d0714/1606778508290/68694950514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/57f3a20a-d125-4425-a70c-97a135357e93/ge_network_protection_and_automation_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/95da9529-8a87-4318-80f3-5023161686a1/88486634147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7b03cf03-0e62-4e80-a592-5c1691f38b63/zygor_guides_free_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d3452225-0af0-466b-a171-a7be5a456e76/24078061703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bd10.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBD10 5632 bytes
SHA-256: 368471e4b5528b1c73a5108aacbc2db7e70cd8549e5f5190485a50dbb432efcb
font_01_sfnt_off0000d02f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD02F 12188 bytes
SHA-256: e9a63eeacc46aef9f8335bdc52d84953d0fc3c7042b136153d70becac098ac79

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