Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 592c5d47b909ad9e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

36.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-18
MD5: eae3a2b886252835382260e8e59469cd SHA-1: e4367d7b2ab6c119674c785f2f447a38e463ce00 SHA-256: 592c5d47b909ad9ece554b27fdb17cea5530da799af2bfd84bb3004a5710ca71
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures. The embedded OLE object, objdata_00_off0000506d.bin, is the primary artifact associated with the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000506d.bin
4de210e2b052b4398142e6866e9ecf41101b6c804243b8d8d8cd7c84ffdbe572
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x506D 1259 bytes