Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 590c7a30601a1709…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.11 MB
MD5: 768e4e2a96ee4b88675c98ff4a211de8 SHA-1: a148530e2eb1e3f0bec055f57b0c43d22f40b5f4 SHA-256: 590c7a30601a170954eecdddd699ba3159e21a9d6521522ff2aa976def0bd498
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1071.001 Application Layer Compromise T1566.001 Privilege Escalation T1071.002 Remote Services Execution

The file utilizes a standard OOXML dropper pattern, employing default-encrypted Office documents and the Equation Editor OLE object to deliver a malicious payload. The presence of the ClamAV detection, combined with the Equation Editor CLSID and the high-entropy Ole10Native stream, strongly suggests an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882 or similar Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The decrypted package reveals a hidden document containing the malicious payload. The file likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload from a remote server, leveraging the Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.af2fa5c5d0587870-9978799-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.af2fa5c5d0587870-9978799-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.