Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 58ea34b6ce3bac39…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

232.2 KB Created: 2020-12-17 14:31:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 466caccf2b3d5499fc4896ee8acbec50 SHA-1: eb8db7c43404f9c105ca1e9f19f358d17a994427 SHA-256: 58ea34b6ce3bac3917f274af84a99c3d22db73c20fe9589718e39792591281d1
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is a package that carries an executable or script file, specifically a JAR file. This suggests the document is a delivery mechanism for a secondary payload. The embedded OLE object itself is the primary IOC.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
1190086a62bab14ffdd460f7f918a2d0bfa95a3da308f0f96f9d9c44e6deab70		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 223744 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
4c260e2fb07a6e183d7a8082347a3bc1cfe4d401d94fb9d8f4a2cfc01721b2f4		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 219298 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
fc8f1e936625c17441aed0805ca4346ac92690dd62326ca1554924eb09f8a97b		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.