Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 58e21d31b958279f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.8 KB Created: 2020-11-06 13:16:17 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: 5fcd85a0c07668b91b61d2f7b2a2ac3a SHA-1: b035040a8c36bb111adb07aa9270f547da559caa SHA-256: 58e21d31b958279f68cb8ccb195008a9550645ae36773f2403cfefe6b67c40ce
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many pointing to disposable hosting, and one known malicious redirector. This indicates a link farm or SEO poisoning strategy to direct users to malicious content. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous external links suggests the primary goal is to redirect the user to a malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=rectangle+area+formula+base In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366395/normal_5f873c8e2cc67.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413000/normal_5f9de195cf5d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426550/normal_5f99b3c0f36b0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sokuvotaboraj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776263/c78f845f5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366407/normal_5f9a7bfba9553.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://butiziro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308177/2e1d0ee948.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tabogivazosepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871767/xoxezal_vodapusej_pulobuvodibepo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pigogokeda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857695/9e8409928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seriraradekabas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016679/zawenegomut_lemedodabebozax_fijuwizowupi_zekitesewiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5bd85283-098e-4dad-a277-063eb010f9dd/pipefixewesixizel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ad082ddd-ebc8-4072-87e5-99804a90e54d/8058771683.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/regovadeje/nidowedudagunotijokexev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sukobogixe/magic_school_bus_lesson_plan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a3a28c06-0c6a-4a32-b333-b4dcd7a36407/wukomogokukike.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000720f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x720F 5348 bytes
SHA-256: c23436066e6fd4f3010f665f9d35ab8578c9030a5a859c538f2eceea4595697a
font_01_sfnt_off00008431.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8431 11140 bytes
SHA-256: d46dc98f4d9540a777800e051e6eddf844746640130accb9c482078441e4d5e4