Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 58d3f80fc88e31b3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.2 KB Created: 2021-02-25 04:04:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-03
MD5: 8cb6de063ef853d1a40d496985f0bb50 SHA-1: 64604f6aede4887d0c576de7a3116497498a3c65 SHA-256: 58d3f80fc88e31b33cdf9ff25429eff60225b8165950bcf0325111154bccb776
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO spam operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to redirect users to phishing sites or potentially download further malware. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack pattern involves leveraging embedded URIs for malicious redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://leonvi.ru/award?keyword=harga+salon+jbl+eon+615 PDF link annotation
    • https://namowabe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134000139/f97e6bac94.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ranedesipa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398497/vozapowujokogilabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xufetujada.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134745175/gagikizoraz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4388426/normal_5fed7c4231254.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4499351/normal_5fce9907c5494.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://metenesepagozo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134710396/tobexirikoxik_jolod_sonarib_xomate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426675/normal_601981c0bb90a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://woduluzotuni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134373450/17e8845.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xumogimunosu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607683/1e33d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojoranazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134403481/d0610e59436c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://barisetufor.66ghz.com/zowosijuruzizubefafasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kaxapajitab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134896246/pulumonegosabuva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nokafixawawi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606940/5a08de7cd2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zolezuborejizo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444688/povenerixutomuje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4379054/normal_5fcbc3880867f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fusarutuzazeni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135346017/xonilovajijuwezawor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bexoxofimimiwox.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775405/9567375.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010694.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10694 5360 bytes
SHA-256: 8db05c0f3ef46821eeadbf10a59e0025c867fe05ef8a6901708f47d44e572780
font_01_sfnt_off000118e9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x118E9 11632 bytes
SHA-256: 68b64da5d499f19cd77b24182b38dfded4522d07186eb8772654b9442e0bfecb