Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 58a2f616ccb5b968…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.9 KB Created: 2021-06-15 13:34:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: d367561832e3e3129a9b4f824c3204e5 SHA-1: 9fddf5a2f4816393cf0ec1b8a882ee6a5327dd5e SHA-256: 58a2f616ccb5b968d8b713367cb93f9fe0d0741d886c43c24f259b151e16e322
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including ML classification and ClamAV detection. The document employs a 'password-protected archive handoff' lure, suggesting it is designed to trick users into believing they need a password to open an archive, which is a common tactic for bypassing security filters. The presence of numerous external URIs, many pointing to compromised CMS uploads, indicates a link farm designed to host or redirect to malicious content. While no scripts were directly extracted, the overall structure and heuristic firings strongly suggest a phishing or malware distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://drafthe.ru/uplcv?utm_term=winrar+password+remove PDF link annotation
    • https://elitestrategyglobal.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/91fa28656b901b4963feaeb34fb1ea89/gitazotoxelodamobesilipiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.tomasjelinek.com/img/pub/file/fekakovopofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.marsagri.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608eb6fd21597---puduxakazovejatevodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kaufdeinauto.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16086c7cc4c1e2---kiboxavosajutelotifuwuzuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://j1medical.com/uploaded/file/jemafuxise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.teppiche-waschen-hamburg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089d1ecec3c2---fewuxevupixigon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://soupworld.de/upload/file/61476720444.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.aserspa.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/njmsqqumho76mk9r34v361e3p3/46593508292.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.chartsunlimited.com.ph/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607eb1d0a2f83---96712249681.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tirthmobile.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/00eb8rov01hoatnsdmci4fdkcp/77472247240.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://1970fchs50thclassreunion.com/clients/1/19/19770213778af891f1b13fa25f964f50/File/90361094178.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fanti-fitness.pl/uploads/assets/file/xiburevaremiziwegeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fertilizerproductionprocess.com/d/files/6674352451.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reiki-roots.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071aaf85d72d---55397807385.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sckstone.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3e9601a9c7eb09b70777bec462b990f4/jemolukofezemupadi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://annjulieskarpmo.com/userfiles/file/92511989772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://surrattsville69.com/clients/8/81/8122276c22396d7fa0996010cc369f50/File/40798523141.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f409.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF409 5240 bytes
SHA-256: d97a9aafee1f25a33d99faf4a4cd43d7007232f5236b3d355a83ad8221f900a9
font_01_sfnt_off000105d9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x105D9 11112 bytes
SHA-256: ce9b586d8cc76cedb0fd03676200de12ad63bd4e9a2baa71270e063fb2fcd05b
font_02_sfnt_off00012c24.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C24 16400 bytes
SHA-256: 3f0697ef8e4f4be2776c3d80cc7271a2ede5a91d1c4cfe99ebc2d6beac97faf0

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