Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 58807a7fe05bf968…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.7 KB Created: 2021-07-31 15:34:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: c8b7d36b7d6a2dd0db77d4d38ae90feb SHA-1: 7956f7948c9270927c43ec38e2f1a5f0ebec5b1b SHA-256: 58807a7fe05bf9684e79b5e4f7447bde627c55cd4f4aef90b3a04c799789e161
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to external resources, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS uploads or disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a 'Fake invoice / payment lure' heuristic further supports the phishing pretext. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the overall structure and heuristic firings suggest a phishing campaign aiming to deliver a malicious payload via embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9949

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dinskayarealty.ru/media/file/84787969905.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://asi-filter.pl/files/file/12680051674.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://too.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e2ec5a07a16e0d07c01c9b10ba876eae/52144947424.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://minhtoangalaxyhotel.vn/app/webroot/files/ckfinder/files/peniwok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tantex.org/tantex/tantexuserfiles/file/50287148088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nhachoxebus.com/upload/fck/file/zikanazot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.info-service.com.tw/plugin/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/59241413745.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimpishio2bet.com/contents//files/gefiniwulowaju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totaleclipsenv.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ff53643638f---8396667360.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fattyweng.com.sg/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070650de8638---44831450250.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wbbray.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608af75593447---tifimukedifosebazaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartcookieacademy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c1acd2d8386---98514153060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bezagsecurity.cz/userfiles/57632470883.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ecef-groupe.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/flvtchjkvsden047mek5im5365/delotowarimanapefuboziv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://beaufortbond.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5e6476bffdb83935603d1c84290c1c2a/duwomi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tucsonhomewindowtint.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/244745cd03fb5007c73243d3dd0d736c/lezotikiminofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://banglatalkies.com/dynamic-images/cms/file/82933174434.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.conkite.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/27f2f1ba5651cfdc3691190cec028582/mupafajaxazekofigifura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://edwardfmcgintypa.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/95775544724.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nanumed.ro/uploads/files/24350802014.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kingspec.su/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/r2n62jgsmijm8i7plgd0hrjgh7/17905755018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://asiatravel.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/34a3a8453a2eb453559f54a984c2294d/tajiwefagavuvimisota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c59eb41c5af---49603723748.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://stoewebdesign.no/userfiles/file/ribikezokoperomowilot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ahkjt.com/upfile/file/70985915244.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ferado.vn/userfiles/file/tubigimufipukilijizax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://engroupe.ca/aym_image/files/tuvutuvufenimolisenol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=exemple+dossier+professionnel+transport+de+marchandise+sur+porteurPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f0a5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0A5 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off000108bc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108BC 11072 bytes
SHA-256: 7f26364d01000d14ea1757e49682a51b7b78fb83823e10da28e197c0323731a6
font_02_sfnt_off0001224e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1224E 19016 bytes
SHA-256: a649173522d7d28536dad1b6871de8b45fd809a6efaadde66731442ba33656e8

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