Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5861323ea0c54394…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.3 KB Created: 2021-05-30 22:17:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f109b8abbb7a1e719d4a878ba5fd200f SHA-1: aef0ea85d1e8de65e2563c604cf9d3d603565074 SHA-256: 5861323ea0c5439447a6884d6b7aeb1e3713e6eb735dc4b83a043ea0597dde0f
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document was identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, flagging it as a phishing trojan. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. The primary purpose appears to be facilitating access to external malicious resources rather than executing code directly from the PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mezovuduw.ru/strik?utm_term=what+to+order+at+kung+fu+tea
    • https://larigagip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134887586/715fd73ac7d783.pdf
    • https://lafetewefovizav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134385578/5314295.pdf
    • https://jumifusat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134629025/luriwikum.pdf
    • https://vijugurapun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814303/tafizezuvidevamose.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4409107/normal_5ff95e7fd4a74.pdf
    • https://fafenerukore.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398145/zegibe_wuluzijusuru.pdf
    • https://xupotigoxurope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134657266/jebuwuvuzuvawenenaz.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384142/normal_600a7bffd4e7f.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4462736/normal_5fcc0243bbe8f.pdf
    • https://wabomojufodeze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999178/306d49c88.pdf
    • https://donadoleli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134519335/wetizikovon_jogerako_lefawemikugomep.pdf
    • https://jenodaxadow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012655/minepebodepopujofu.pdf
    • https://nododekevage.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134733794/lazuwapetazig.pdf
    • https://vekiruwubutut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070393/953645.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379231/normal_60334a7b16b48.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4490132/normal_5fd9f5cd631c3.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4494165/normal_601e9a2e310d4.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454807/normal_605db08f726a9.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4417040/normal_5ff0cd130e289.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e573.bin
d978b6fd6ba97e4b71298f0478e1777ca38f9c927b3e6eaebc7778f42b0ac270		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE573 5036 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f6a1.bin
00a72d9870ea41e990b03a11dddb4de8c5a8a35878b9ff8f1395aaa6a8ceb6dd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6A1 11644 bytes

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