Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 583ec5ab337459c2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

102.8 KB Created: 2018-05-27 21:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-10
MD5: 6fa60c61c425276fd863aceda94bc004 SHA-1: a6d9e302091c44e6cc8a1d163ab3e11c7252910d SHA-256: 583ec5ab337459c2b8501504301cf219f63ff3fa741e0421f37424ac85227c8d
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of a legacy WordBasic Autoopen macro (OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC) indicates the document is designed to automatically execute code when opened. The large slack space anomaly (OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY) is often used to hide malicious content within OLE files. No specific family could be identified, and no actionable IOCs were extracted from the document body or embedded URLs.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 105,216 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,238 bytes — 68,978 bytes (66%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

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