RTF malware analysis — malicious · 580e488c29c3ef3f

MALICIOUS

RTF

15.6 KB First seen: 2022-10-04

MD5: ab8c3cdd2b1a657622e7628ba9293ee2 SHA-1: 2bd50a349a059ed46c28e90af5edaabfe413fc2b SHA-256: 580e488c29c3ef3f6dd388fcba934ced1662147019d66f8a2a7011a7f8e60f8f

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit this known vulnerability. The `SE_ENABLE_LURE` heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable content, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures and execute the exploit.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001d87.bin` `3fc4014a6bcf5048575ceb816b6af38b2d38bd722868a615aed9bef246a5cd04`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D87	1461 bytes

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