Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 57feb90dcbb3df0b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

123.4 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 97a3d097c686b5348084f5b4df8396ce SHA-1: c0ac2443856deebbf7ed99e57431e06fd56bf677 SHA-256: 57feb90dcbb3df0b8572083a340de615a4c77db236b88d959f5785f8d7d9dff7
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The OLE document exhibits significant slack space and an appended executable payload, indicating it's designed to conceal and deliver malicious code. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended executable bytes strongly suggests a dropper or loader functionality. The file's SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 126,365 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 101,800 bytes (81%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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