Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 57ed33d95fe69848…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: d11dc15e85af0929880533a758128002 SHA-1: f79115814a59c95a1c80052e15fdc1ed51319ccd SHA-256: 57ed33d95fe69848b006ff90f8592086386d3845edf16670b5881214b27a9d5f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. The ` tf_objupdate` directive forces OLE activation, leading to arbitrary code execution. The specific class `equatIoN.3` is a strong indicator of this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b7.bin
ec7e7278d24070bb38a6b95129ec6c21784d9267de733e8d46c24dcf8d956b5f		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB7 1539 bytes

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