Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 57e5c265d656679c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

74.7 KB First seen: 2023-08-10
MD5: 5d9c159b4f92258984669a10666c92e8 SHA-1: abd23d16580e3bee61b190c85a0eebcdbfb30bd4 SHA-256: 57e5c265d656679c7c2ac2b0a255264a6a8dc01cf5205964afed49709f38560f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation upon opening, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing'. This suggests the file is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004180.bin
1dfe6d14b5f0cba395b999d2465986272c2b06c85f35644dd92edf623d6338b8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4180 1670 bytes