Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 57aca7fc07cc2d52…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.2 KB
MD5: 87872ed8c9ba802830765c902f91d367 SHA-1: e92c48b14ffc4baf8f4a0864ea9d642507f0974e SHA-256: 57aca7fc07cc2d52d95ca6cee1fddce1c334686d46f069f35c24b4fec440753c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and triggers an ".objupdate" command, indicating it attempts to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bc.bin
56c9cf50b0cad1da581cc73a2567fbbd5c4ab80a51af82f5c424577522c0a823
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBC 1405 bytes