Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 579bfab4da147b83…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.8 KB Created: 2020-03-30 15:53:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 2399caadcf87206567f5f27c724ea183 SHA-1: 457ddcc245e575b779227f7300a07cc34f3b309c SHA-256: 579bfab4da147b837b40b6941b3decc10d7d083313ead1d859c2f775e84fc2d0
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, pointing to various domains. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to these external URLs, suggesting a coordinated effort to redirect users to potentially harmful content. The primary attack pattern appears to be a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results or host further malicious payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://yinghuangwangshangyule.br3h.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621548/130621548.html#codigos+cnc+g
    • http://glamfam.store/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621390/fujuvene.pdf
    • http://hcqw.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775768/e247853a.pdf
    • http://betterbloodwork.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398424/jinokugej.pdf
    • http://c3designsnsweets.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130477346/3230529.pdf
    • http://teddybearbernedoodle.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130435892/lujekivijozir-pipanerexezin-gokuvuse.pdf
    • http://robertjohnsonpainting.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130288486/589875d7ab.pdf
    • http://greatheart.us/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776089/bugerefas_tokutafoso_jelor.pdf
    • http://fortisundis.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130550700/napojijarututajed.pdf
    • http://polarityspin.net/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289288/dupewedinedoxovugi.pdf
    • http://mountainbikegreenville.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874309/8727989.pdf
    • http://ocils.net/uploads/1/3/0/5/130540134/6b18bc0780.pdf
    • http://exteriorcontractor.co/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969704/5670979.pdf
    • http://thirddayministriesinternational.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739624/5333534.pdf
    • http://dubaisolarcctv.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130605341/livabe_gujavun.pdf
    • http://shadygrovemarket.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814526/wazodada.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000080e7.bin
b3aba5a6cddd8afcf25e456e5e6d2e3f6d44c83e9fc3d04a3d90c9d0818a80ad		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80E7 8840 bytes

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