Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 576bf47b6cd9c1fc

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

72.5 KB First seen: 2020-02-04

MD5: 7e12f26123c34efd9a7acf3e5859cf42 SHA-1: db059bce64a4bf23af6c83caaa34754a5da37130 SHA-256: 576bf47b6cd9c1fc11e40de8bdaa726d554cd56a95abccf14e707937f9f5f0b8

62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of a legacy WordBasic AutoOpen macro indicates an attempt to automatically execute code upon opening the document. The large slack space anomaly suggests potential obfuscation or padding within the OLE structure. Without further script content, the exact payload and execution chain remain unclear, leading to a moderate confidence level.

Heuristics 3

OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY

OLE file is 74,200 bytes but its declared streams total only 35,901 bytes — 38,299 bytes (52%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

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