Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 576aeff7f1272f50…

MALICIOUS

RTF

62.1 KB First seen: 2023-10-12
MD5: bb973c3280643cb3da16e508325158ba SHA-1: 76632193c1757813bd396f6c93ab597ce8ab357b SHA-256: 576aeff7f1272f505d250f9ffa5e0a470a83aa42daa88533aa1cb0f9447145cf
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically leveraging the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body presents a financial audit-related lure, instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures. This combination strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism designed to trigger the Equation Editor vulnerability upon activation.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002982.bin
bc41b4db5d766b4d4acd45980b6f48ef98731e694fbd8d173c8d29979320a117
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2982 1494 bytes