Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5762a173b3cb2512…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

414.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-04-20
MD5: de37ac8904220f419c2933bf64a87f43 SHA-1: 28a2cee671e69590b37d2711ea091ced32fd7797 SHA-256: 5762a173b3cb2512706a88b92d83fb46c28cc3cf8ca7404fd3d0e1ebdb7d7e22
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to download a remote file from http://107.175.202.201/h/%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23.doc. Although no VBA code was found to be executable, the presence of an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings suggests a multi-stage attack. The overall behavior points to a downloader attempting to fetch and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://107.175.202.201/h/%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_001_off00000960.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x960 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011800.pdf
92a17d6a4bc2d944ff9d4a412b00a8fb324209c3dd2f54ad8616054f44932c30		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11800 352256 bytes

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