RTF malware analysis — malicious · 575c18f18dcf79e1

MALICIOUS

RTF

79.1 KB First seen: 2024-09-03

MD5: c7c92e5b818f1f959604d147d1676615 SHA-1: 1b1ac7cab7550481bd41132a1a87c1ddb92e06a7 SHA-256: 575c18f18dcf79e109cdfe499056f7300f650306a65ddbe29375fb33d1fe3128

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document. This exploit is known to facilitate the execution of arbitrary code, commonly used to download and execute further stages of malware. No document body or script content was available for analysis, but the heuristics strongly suggest a classic exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000019c1.bin` `e0437a52285ffbb4ae1098bca4876999995eaa25d4e4a0e5da1ef6918aa54752`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x19C1	1541 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.