Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5757a254c1e153a4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

30.9 KB First seen: 2022-12-05
MD5: 76e335141e2b9a980df125ae5b6fec05 SHA-1: abdb4e3607da7ce11d6008db1c61ff370cfba9d5 SHA-256: 5757a254c1e153a42aeb5f92f117755bf7012584bab72bd2d5247bf5b541f99c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID and an objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which would activate the OLE object and likely trigger the exploit. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000057e8.bin
8d29682d55287b8f632f6a006f7589b9e2d89f0ad4aed75283eb4dfe6da77696
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E8 1990 bytes