Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 573c2c9707c51cbb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.7 KB Created: 2020-10-26 02:24:19 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: c856a69b984d2a9ac902dbbd76a7297a SHA-1: 91f58a3ad8507335caddaa6081f484368cf8fbbd SHA-256: 573c2c9707c51cbbec0a91bdd62e3ea25cfb5a9051e9bf2c9cfaf623256e8cd0
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=circleci+tutorial+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://ximazula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738777/8560432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rusezoxebob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355184/wosaguvixibo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rulomegujenuguv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134329868/kibutazizow_labibajat_wewivimigelales_betikezuji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mesipaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383407/6297767.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4401538/normal_5f95e01cc9a32.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374207/normal_5f8be886b116a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368496/normal_5f90d3ee34d55.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372105/normal_5f8fd3d0b77ce.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412774/normal_5f961063597ab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00007d75.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00007d75.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5591/4918/files/how_to_install_virtual_audio_cable.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6740/0601/files/zolukomuzig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9922/6265/files/thousands_hundreds_tens_and_ones_worksheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/bofinuguxomojozixeje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/68448657599.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/7452/5594/files/android_preferencescreen_divider_color.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/5198/2233/files/multi_step_linear_equations_worksheet_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/memul/bedofifibanigezoledesubem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/susopuzupure/37009297994.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lanubili/xilikes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00007d75.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007d75.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D75 4876 bytes
SHA-256: e58144ede27da901b0575bf4d75f96b9607c9c9e047f50fb367d6de1a6009148
font_01_sfnt_off00008e10.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8E10 11500 bytes
SHA-256: 7e5e3468f92d3305e04f18d5501268fb778af0636e72dad9241b46394c056c63