Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 57334e39ca76cfd2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.4 KB
MD5: c07e2161fc6acd13ff2d3a4aa99d4090 SHA-1: df905e9deba8b8a54a6e1d598a87a740f504b798 SHA-256: 57334e39ca76cfd265828ce7cd2df3aa1589bf49ebdde22bc4853152347d8763
346 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that is heavily obfuscated and utilizes custom Base64 decoding. This script is designed to exploit multiple Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The primary intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection 'Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18' on an extracted artifact. The exploit chain is initiated via the PDF's OpenAction trigger.

Heuristics 10

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
0563e22741062e842171ceda24ae5e2d7825fa48bc761144241ef9d30aa71d5e
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 18876 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
custom_b64_stage_000.js
0b65355f254449e36868297c87a2fd9643ed0398564af064e915a2788c6d14f9
deobfuscated-js custom Base64 decoded JavaScript layer 2 (PDF /JS object 9) at offset 0x450 10094 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).