Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 571a55d33c0e59d9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

107.0 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 440f18f806d665df62b10082a1af3782 SHA-1: 5aed30a3632c3909c5055f0dfac2c3cfdb75c04f SHA-256: 571a55d33c0e59d966e67bcae7fdaebb61d7b48d878aff9dbc6542b9bb47adb8
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OLE spreadsheet exhibits characteristics of a malicious document, including a large unaccounted-for region and an appended executable payload. Although VBA macros could not be extracted, the presence of appended executable bytes strongly suggests the file is designed to deliver a secondary payload. The SHA256 hash is included as an indicator of compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 109,592 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 85,027 bytes (78%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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