Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 57145990fc1a301f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

239.7 KB Created: 2018-10-29 02:26:00 First seen: 2019-02-26
MD5: dbf9580947e52ab6421bd18eb0265167 SHA-1: a77174c917754520e877b3f71f2973b5c5e1bc68 SHA-256: 57145990fc1a301f95a9041ba2654d6634a155a70fbeb050fe76920602dc52ba
362 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882 via the Equation Editor. This exploit is known to deliver a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1' and the presence of shellcode API strings in extracted artifacts further support its role as a dropper. The embedded URLs, particularly 'http://185.231.48.210/akeo.tmp', are highly suspicious and likely point to the location of the dropped payload.

Heuristics 10

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://naviny.by/article/20180921/1537554764-sochi-dubl-dva-lukashenko-i-putin-razoshlis-molcha In RTF body
    • https://naviny.by/aIn RTF body
    • https://naviny.by/article/20181024/1540389812-belorusov-ne-greet-perspektiva-popast-v-ray-po-sheme-putinaIn RTF body
    • https://naviny.by/article/20180920/1537463982-amerikanskaya-baza-v-polshe-oslabit-kozyri-lukashenko-v-igre-s-moskvoyIn RTF body
    • https://naviny.by/article/20181008/1538974254-faktor-moskvy-vnosit-napryazhenie-v-otnosheniya-mezhdu-minskom-i-kievomIn RTF body
    • http://enkorr.com.ua/a/news/Rossiyskie_i_belorusskie_postavki_DT_prakticheski_sravnyalis/234168In RTF body
    • https://naviny.by/new/20181026/1540572695-poroshenko-poobeshchal-skoruyu-translyaciyu-na-belarus-ukrainskogoIn RTF body
    • http://www.f4cky0u.me/login.gifIn RTF body
    • http://185.231.48.210/akeo.tmpIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body
    • https://ru.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idRUKCN1N01HU-ORUBSIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00012908.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x12908 61764 bytes
SHA-256: d4b98d6a92729bae1969ae53ba7e221eefb573b4591a0c66328e134a141b803e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, CreateFileA, kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, VirtualAlloc
objdata_01_off0003b63a.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3B63A 510 bytes
SHA-256: 48d425a2870de525064cd9769b7bc09e6b3d7abde365724bb49a99a16279a5bc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS