RTF malware analysis — malicious · 5705cdd93bd849ac

MALICIOUS

RTF

90.7 KB First seen: 2024-07-19

MD5: e677d8183d89a410a3ce59db5a2722d3 SHA-1: 969255020b8e5b9cf16ffa6dd7c8f931e7b68ce7 SHA-256: 5705cdd93bd849acc4bfc1a9a2fa9b4c6f9e4b1dd1dbd43b0e8b35c32519d6d2

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of these embedded objects, leading to code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, although no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000e7d.bin` `fa0db5dac1693899b9724d4e49e0759e0564272374a7288a175497f4484672a0`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xE7D	1816 bytes

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