Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56fbefebcf055d2b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

14.7 KB
MD5: 9c3746d29340181380a7949676de5c23 SHA-1: 653bbc60aae911257d9fd5516239a8bd576370c1 SHA-256: 56fbefebcf055d2bf98c85ca5ab7e16abba318b2ef7871a529ba94132318b928
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object is intended to be activated automatically. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a malicious payload, likely a second-stage downloader. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laced documents.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001f92.bin
8c39b92f45e2bf999919580d6081303b0094d01c0c29475fd83e12bab606227b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F92 1900 bytes