Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56f1394c4ad36d7f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.2 KB Created: 2020-10-14 19:12:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: 9302cfcceb4829ee73905d1b434ae02d SHA-1: e3d45ecf2d6d30f5ee752aa60fa7c4aaa21230f5 SHA-256: 56f1394c4ad36d7fd0112d8809c45cc0f7bb51d8b12ba477c70c28078a6e9d25
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/pify?keyword=google+play+service+download+apk+android In PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/likanutavorolebonat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gevafitasib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380901/c25f730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/rajojul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/18ad995.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/sulusilalope-jobede.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037132.mozfiles.com/files/1037132/71944058967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040006.mozfiles.com/files/1040006/38017673023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/kasodopizafazakoxuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keniwuki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483234/32e063a95e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/7989682.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/9594994.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/kadijamiruvinugeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/3718456.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1048523.mozfiles.com/files/1048523/794940872.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037227.mozfiles.com/files/1037227/patavigodubepup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037860.mozfiles.com/files/1037860/giderovi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042670.mozfiles.com/files/1042670/98298928337.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043124.mozfiles.com/files/1043124/43574729405.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0480/7000/0804/files/the_burning_maze_free_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0541/0471/files/truck_loader_4_level_26.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0459/2471/2597/files/nc_cdl_test_study_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e83.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E83 5592 bytes
SHA-256: 4df3df1e1f0329c19337823d4dd350fdde139ab70a8a2dc3ddccd11b68bee1f0
font_01_sfnt_off000081b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x81B7 9880 bytes
SHA-256: 14ce278cd47b67b86d1f04f14af67ece7bce79891708bb9543e67e21062cf2d4

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