Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56da84a04c47851c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.3 KB First seen: 2022-03-30
MD5: d879ba280d25552926586c4403c98c8b SHA-1: 7014944c9aac37459030f1f121a541067d9e41bf SHA-256: 56da84a04c47851cec52070df0650086acb37b62a1564d1394f74df33e1a3afe
121 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and triggers an objupdate event, indicating an attempt to activate embedded content. Critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJDATA strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically for downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001d32.bin
3e1c0eebbaf9b4b283338f0e8d888f08247f0c2249251b15a89db70c6ce1855c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D32 1428 bytes