Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56c8bf9cba953bc2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

45.0 KB Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 909fc46b99bf0e4a0816e4bc466b5489 SHA-1: 5b39ca9c411a4a11ab35b97efc091646a54ec518 SHA-256: 56c8bf9cba953bc28cb39ff3f7759108c65cf1d12c92ba5704ad0f28354e1dd7
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an OLE document with suspicious static findings, including large slack space and unreadable streams, indicating potential obfuscation or corruption. The document body presents a financial breakdown for timber processing, likely a lure to disguise the malicious embedded OLE object. The embedded object itself exhibits critical static triage findings, suggesting it is the primary malicious component.

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 23,868 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 23,868 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off000056c4.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x56C4 23868 bytes
SHA-256: 0ffaeaa875a0a47430bed29c06324e925009efe44913e8f1583edc535ef6ffa5