Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56aa47ed75e94dad…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

7.6 KB
MD5: 5a173d191614591f95ee9a0c0a4545c2 SHA-1: 48d08e613078a0915ee7a749c9d319ff5563971d SHA-256: 56aa47ed75e94dad361eacb1b5bc40044ae34e120d2cbd15105283c2c6727948
168 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OOXML document contains a VBA macro that executes the Auto_open subroutine. This subroutine uses URLDownloadToFileA to download two files: 'http://updatewin32.xyz/3.txt' to '%PUBLIC%\msi.ps1' and 'http://edc.com.ly/index/wp.txt' to '%PUBLIC%\ComeCome.vbs'. The use of Environ("Public") indicates an attempt to write to the public user profile directory, likely to execute the downloaded scripts.

Heuristics 5

  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
9fa854ba03056cbe7aaee45f42ec4cebeb38bfd7d06f980ee627cf8d248c2cd2
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 567 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
1f05169e8367974095dc1454799615ff3f3b2f9262ba3ef38c7b0243c0ccd754
vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes