Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 56a627a18c1fdcf5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

23.2 KB First seen: 2022-11-09
MD5: 16cbadcbba1a7b46aee6a5d717e351f8 SHA-1: 9de024741fc70724dc552d051bb8c7f961c9758a SHA-256: 56a627a18c1fdcf583d104261c612b0c67ad0475003d4219cfbd64e354b92930
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a ProgID associated with Equation Editor, triggered by \objupdate. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to enable editing, a common tactic for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The embedded OLE object is the primary mechanism for exploitation.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004672.bin
1b84ed1b885725d63ec8d90ca67a4698424819abf48d6f1c548fd3f72d4fc396
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4672 1608 bytes