Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 569876ecaf7432b2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

787.3 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 680821aff49f87512910c7a802f992be SHA-1: 409f821fc18894cd55579347214f49e0e2098d8e SHA-256: 569876ecaf7432b24d2482d50eb00aab45cadcb7e17aed8959eccedf8a6554fb
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. No VBA or JavaScript was extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, making further analysis of the payload's intent difficult.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000bfe0f.bin
b53f97db21c34aec1f6d610d857bb5af087c0ef6142ff33bb602c5e304bdfb41
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBFE0F 3739 bytes