Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5691cae714e07aba…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

31.5 KB Created: 2017-12-04 15:11:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-12-24
MD5: 1fedeb967c5842a26cf7486de37ece42 SHA-1: ab615fd7404d7f5d88a8ac9b8010b3e6ed1d0b7a SHA-256: 5691cae714e07aba2d06461aab0d065de48c0980503499992172afb1def3db7c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that uses a fake payment confirmation lure to trick users into enabling content. It contains an embedded OLE object with a payload URL, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-21514. The embedded object also contains a .lnk file, suggesting the execution of a secondary payload. The document body explicitly instructs the user to enable editing, further supporting the lure.

Heuristics 8

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • External hyperlinks (1) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 1 external hyperlink — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: http://eway.ca/
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://drakeonline.info/changelog/aSdjfhjahVhmdf In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://eway.ca/Document hyperlink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 5120 bytes
SHA-256: e105e07c9993dfac306703e2174d233b71c6910ea3d95226ee50d28a1253e585
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2846 bytes
SHA-256: 30afdb4e0bb3d0cc4022c7a1b23264f774f6c90a95505968c1d63d551b066be6
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 5120 bytes
SHA-256: 566ac0a6785dc40172467bb53b8c72807f962f1dc377bf94c4021f25d93f144d
ooxml_oleobject_01_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2834 bytes
SHA-256: bcb8f5cdaf669862c5cf40b86e47759c511520a7696ed727c7684b66ead97ed0
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5172 bytes
SHA-256: 0007f6de6cfcf998e093759e26ccb9b069764a9eb2b9aa8bf77719ab0c78d6a2
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 79c1a7e6ac730cb9620247a0763cb405c05b0958cb25bc8bce06b43ea6039f0f