Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 565bb0e503ca4821…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB First seen: 2022-03-30
MD5: 72751f1b07f0b11f1a48f45106940e24 SHA-1: fb03ca6fdda645fe56ae8838c558c5125f70b4e7 SHA-256: 565bb0e503ca4821e3dce2d0783780aeca345937b6e4d82a3ce759f18d03d970
121 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c1.bin
a4eebdb7015dabd21a4e1a047a9f8b8927294b25ec84b5758c036f7bd82f2d2f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC1 1712 bytes