Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 565653183a54c8c3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.33 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 68d88a092f9bc33ece620bd8c23a9842 SHA-1: 775040716acb7f2f6eccf66629d23f547a2dc653 SHA-256: 565653183a54c8c3f203d9857b17ca4bd68fd081d64ffedebb95294dfb80cf1b
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability in MSXML SAX OLE activation, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJUPDATE suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. The document body is heavily obfuscated, preventing a clear understanding of its specific lure, but the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0013a68e.bin
add8a7373f473063f1baa4f730cdb7c53b2626381f89ddf3b543c6adf1c9dbab
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13A68E 3732 bytes