Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5650a2189cf8ae18…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.3 KB Created: 2021-02-14 02:01:02 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: fc5120f0ed2a4cf627b3e612897d3276 SHA-1: 7da1f026e25d35590f9953c8bffbd0c02ca8f7b9 SHA-256: 5650a2189cf8ae182720c3b821dadad7b4c18b1a636526fa190cb757428a0bbc
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on disposable domains and appear to be part of a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest it's designed to exploit users through deceptive content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wb?keyword=autocad%20handbook%20free%20%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://klokisik.space/jubolodefruig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pidowiwosuzaji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969191/wodemibejazupujijep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepidunobon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452842/motegosidid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pubodegosog/7jhRUic/download_game_tactical_battle_simulator_mod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zowesifona/m9rghZG/68138512936.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kowedeta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775164/9158442.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sdorovie-sustavi.xyz/fofumatovaberiiwegw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fabebebu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740756/difuxuba-gikenelitagub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wibetunutivemi.iblogger.org/achievement_test_definition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jufulezamuko/igzPjjN/awd_php_html_css_js_ide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kofosobi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134528260/daxatezuwur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://it50save.info/hda_le_dormeur_du_val63jgq.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xukanimuwuvam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696198/1879568.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wavakuxakuxom.66ghz.com/fotuzavunelu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://topdiscount.pro/72219295766ujfio.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rokajoten/JJnNxia/arkanoid_vs_space_invaders_apk_1._0._2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nakuzafol/dapuvunabibadeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fuvogixerad.epizy.com/bookmark_template_for_students.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bozudob.epizy.com/performance_appraisal_comments_on_compliance.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dbbd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDBBD 5224 bytes
SHA-256: 96fcb3c7ef15dfd6b50af3cbe4f0eca9433c782c43095e437c3468fa500bd47e
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed7f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED7F 11436 bytes
SHA-256: a0401f01e411f9802e9f161e812ebdb20a0fffc8abd7ed1429cba73d027f4118