Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 563f31ac3a81be4e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

138.8 KB Created: 2022-07-01 11:29:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-04
MD5: 6bc93939261cf24c7671a93bb76cb31e SHA-1: 3fa2191daadd90b6a070ededc3574b74b5c5391c SHA-256: 563f31ac3a81be4eefa375175476e2744aafe396f0ee79690f8dca9f7279e5c9
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample is a Word document containing an embedded OLE object (ooxml_oleobject_00.bin) which drops a high-entropy JAR file (ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin). This pattern is characteristic of a dropper mechanism designed to execute a Java-based payload upon user interaction. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
74c4bc24cc331ece49c54bb6f4fc5e4c84f9074d6906cbae209064aef30c0a7f		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 113664 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.94, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
ba0b03e4f52e5ef8082f82dac2c30ccad937aa9f18c254248c70e510df436599		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 109911 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
70285e27dd8c8d41ad5e12e7e7eaefb570e82feea1384c030070c608606eba25		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.